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THE SHATTERED GLASS CEILING AND A NARROWING 
GENDER PAY GAP IN NHS FOUNDATION TRUSTS   
Gender and salaries of Chief Executives 
 
ABSTRACT 
Female chief executive officers (CEOs) of NHS foundation trusts have increased 
from 37% in 2012/13 to 47% in 2017/18. This paper shows that, in the five-year 
period analysed, the gender pay gap (GPG) has narrowed to become insignificant. 
The paper suggests the improvement of female presence and the narrowing of the 
GPG go hand-in-hand, at least for these public sector top managers. It also provides 
indication that the GPG is multifaceted, women may sacrifice high salaries for 
future financial security. Women and men could also be negotiating salaries in a 
different way, signalling gender traits differences.  
Keywords: NHS Foundation Trust; CEO; glass ceiling; remuneration; Gender pay gap, 
 
Impact statement  
For CEOs of NHS Foundation Trusts gender parity has been reached. Over a 5-year 
period (2013-2018), salary differences between female and male CEOs have 
narrowed to an insignificant level. Results suggest that shattering the glass ceiling 
helps to reduce the GPG, and hence gender inequalities.    The study also provides 
original insights into different components of the GPG: salary and pension benefits. 
Political leaders must take a wide perspective on pay when considering how to 





THE SHATTERED GLASS CEILING AND A NARROWING 
GENDER PAY GAP IN NHS FOUNDATION TRUSTS   
Gender and salaries of Chief Executives 
 
1. Introduction 
 Gender equity in terms of both the access and promotion of women to top 
management positions and remuneration are, despite improvements, an issue in the 
political agenda of many developed countries. European Union (EU) countries have 
adopted strong positions in favour of equal opportunities. However, women tend to face 
difficulties accessing jobs with the highest salaries and the presence of women in top 
management seats is very low, that is, a glass ceiling effect exists (Alkadry and Tower, 
2006; Arulampalam et al, 2007; Christofides et al, 2013). The presence of women on 
boards has been studied both in the private (see e.g. Sign and Vinnicombe, 2004; Sign et 
al, 2015; Vinnicombe et al, 2015) and in the public sector (e.g. Ellwood and Garcia-
Lacalle, 2015). Female promotion to top management positions is still on the agenda for 
gender equality, and this issue might have hidden other aspects, such as a possible  gender 
pay gap (GPG) in those positions. Even after reaching top positions, the remuneration 
women receive is usually lower than that of men (Elkinawy and Stater, 2011; Gregory-
Smith et al, 2014; McGee et al. 2015; Merluzzi and Dobrev, 2015; Goh and Gupta, 2016; 
Blau and Kahn, 2017; Carter et al, 2017). However, academic literature is needed to 
show a better picture of gender equality after the implementation of new legislation and 
initiatives, this is especially relevant in the public sector, when female presence is 
reaching parity 
Regarding salary differences between women and men, evidence confirms that the 




more evident in the public sector, which usually manages equality with substantive 
support practices, such as considering it during recruitment and selection as well as the 
provision for flexible working and family friendly practices (Jones et al 2018). These 
practices facilitate that women can combine work with upbringing children and are 
expected to reduce gender pay differentials by reducing vertical segregation. Although 
the GPG is lower in the public than in the private sector, it is still persistent across the 
two sectors (Bishu and Alkadry, 2017). The gaps in salary and total pay levels are lower 
in firms with a higher proportion of female presence on the board (Carter et al, 2017).  
The UK enforced the gender equality duty in April 2007 in recognition of the need 
for a radical new approach to equality (GED 2006, p.2). The aim of the duty included 
the narrowing, and eventually the elimination, of the GPG. In the UK, the GPG for full-
time employees is higher in the private (15.9%) than in the public sector (13.1%), but the 
figure for the public sector is the highest since 1999 (see McGuinness and Pyper, 2017). 
According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2017), the GPG for full-time 
employees has narrowed during the last two decades, but improvements depend on the 
region. Devolved nations are closer to pay equality than England, and, in fact, in Northern 
Ireland the pay gap is in favour of women. In England, women earn 10% less than men, 
but there are differences between regions, with northern regions showing a lower GPG. 
London, which had the lowest GPG in the UK in 1997, has made no improvements in 
these two decades and now shows the worst figure. Jones et al (2018) consider that the 
years of public sector austerity after the 2010 financial crisis, represent a stalling point in 
the long-term narrowing of the GPG in the UK. So, despite apparent improvements in 
shattering the glass ceiling and equal remuneration, the GPG is a persistent problem 
acknowledged by the two main political parties. One of the first statements of Theresa 




Jeremy Corbyn asserted during a campaign speech in July 2016, ‘Last year Britain was 
ranked 18th in the world for its gender pay gap ... We can and must do far better.’ (see 
Elming et al, 2016, p. 4). 
The Foundations Trust (FTs) of the National Health Service (NHS) provide a 
unique context in which to study the GPG at the top of the managerial ladder, the CEO 
position, because female presence on these boards is already substantial (Ellwood and 
Garcia-Lacalle, 2015) with a much higher proportion of women than in private sector 
firms. The study of the GPG for a similar ‘job’ in similar entities, healthcare providers 
within the ethos of the NHS, reduces the number of factors that can promote, or facilitate, 
this gap. The focus of our analyses is on NHS FTs because these organisations have 
boards of directors of a similar structure to those of commercial companies but with 
representation from local communities and stakeholders (see Ellwood and Garcia-
Lacalle, 2015). Each FT has the ability to set the remuneration of its board members and 
report their remuneration on an individual basis (see Garcia-Lacalle et al, 2018). and the 
analysis can move to an ‘equal job equal pay’ perspective. 
FTs provide over half of the hospital, mental health and ambulance services in 
England. FTs are distinct bodies that are part of a wide range of NHS organisations 
including clinical commissioning groups (CCGs and arms length bodies. The FTs 
authorised at the end of the 2017/18 financial year generated total operating income of 
more than £52 billion with 750,000 whole time equivalent staff (NHS Improvement, 
2018a). By focusing in one single type of organisation, organisational differences can be 
discarded in the analysis of the GPG This paper examines the evolution of chief executive 
officers (CEOs) female presence in FTs from the end of the financial year 2012/13 to the 
end of 2017/18, the latest year with data available, covering a 5-year period. It also 




characterised by a significant female presence (Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle, 2015, Sealy, 
2017). A high female presence on boards is expected to have a positive effect in reducing 
the GPG among their members. Our study provides insights into the debate about female 
presence and gender pay differences by analysing these aspects for a specific public sector 
board seat with individual information rather than for cohorts of workers with statistical 
data. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the glass ceiling effect and 
the GPG in the public sector. The FT context is briefly presented in Section 3. Section 4 
presents our research design, including the sample selection and the explanation of the 
empirical analyses conducted. Section 5 presents the results, which are discussed in 
Section 6. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 7.  
 
2. The glass ceiling effect and the GPG in the public sector  
One main reason for salary differences between men and women is the lower 
percentage of women in better remunerated jobs. Bradley et al (2015) report that gender 
discrimination is substantial in some public sector occupations, in particular for ‘higher 
level occupations’, whereas they do not find a gender gap for nurses. Kuhlmann et al 
(2017), in a study of large publicly funded academic health centres of four EU countries, 
report that, although the percentage of female medical students and doctors in these 
countries is within the 40–60% gender balance zone, women are less well represented 
among specialists and remain significantly under-represented among senior doctors and 
full professors. These authors state that there has been progress in closing the gender 
leadership gap on boards and other top-level decision-making bodies, but the gap remains 




for promotion among Italian female academic professionals due to gender differences in 
risk-aversion and self-confidence and fear of discrimination. Therefore, in some public 
sector entities, gender traits may also be part of the glass ceiling effect. In a similar way, 
Bosquet et al (2013) find that, once in a promotion contest, there are no gender differences 
in promotion, but women have a substantially lower probability than men to enter the 
promotion contest. They explain their results using two main arguments. First, although 
women are not discriminated during the contest, they believe they will be and, hence, 
decide not to enter in the promotion process. Second, differences in contest participation 
may be partly driven by differences across genders in preferences for taking part in a 
competitive process, which may be the result of women being less confident than men. 
Lower confidence levels may be due to differences in building confidence during early 
childhood. Bosquet et al (2003) also note that, in the promotion processes, ‘candidates 
for full professors are typically between 30 and 40 years of age, when family constraints 
are likely to be substantial’ and may be more onerous for women.  
Private-life factors, such as marital status and parenthood, are also used to explain 
part of the GPG (e.g. Geiler and Renneboog, 2015; Grund, 2015; Hardoy et al, 2017). In 
Norway, the GPG in management positions increases considerably after the arrival of the 
first child and, nine years after the firstborn child, the GPG has increased by around 5% 
(Hardoy et al. 2017). Geiler and Renneboog (2015) find that, for board members 
excluding the CEO, there is a GPG which increases after marriage and parenthood. Grund 
(2015) finds a larger GPG for employees with children, indicating that parental leave is 
much more pronounced for women than men, although the GPG also exists for employees 
without children. 
Despite legislation and social change, gender continues to play a major role in 




favourable context for females than the private sector (Bishu and Alkadry, 2017; Jones et 
al, 2018). A decade ago, Arulampalam et al. (2007) demonstrated that, in many European 
countries, the GPG in the public sector was much lower than in the private sector and 
quantified this difference in a range of between 6 and 16 per cent. More recent data for 
Switzerland also shows that a GPG exists in the public sector, but smaller than in the 
private sector (Anastasiade and Tille, 2017). Antón and Muñoz (2015) find a substantially 
lower GPG in the Spanish public sector. Albæk et al (2017), after controlling for 
segregation -measured as the proportion of females in occupations, industries, 
establishments and job cells- have not found any GPG in the Danish public sector.  
The GPG may be narrower in the public sector than in the private sector, but the 
academic literature indicates that the gap depends on the skills and ranks of workers. 
Anastasiade and Tille (2017) show that in the public sector the GPG occurs uniformly 
both in lower and in higher remunerated jobs, whereas in the private sector, this difference 
is greater in lower remunerated jobs and lower in higher remunerated jobs. As regards 
overall salary differences between the public and the private sector, Antón and Muñoz 
(2015) show that there is a positive wage premium to public sector employment 
concentrated on low-skilled workers, while high-skilled individuals in the public sector 
suffer a pay penalty in relation to the private sector. This salary structure seems to be a 
constant in other countries, like France, the UK and Italy (Lucifora and Meurs, 2006). 
However, there are differences between the three countries; in Italy and France, collective 
bargaining and trade unions favour a more egalitarian wage structure based on observable 
characteristics. In the UK, higher employer discretion in wage setting contributes to 
increase pay dispersion. Giordano et al (2015), for a sample of EU countries, also find a 
pay differential in favour of the public sector that is generally higher for women at the 




Outside the European context, the GPG in the public sector varies depending on the 
country studied. In the Australian public sector, where the average GPG reported is of 
around 8%, the effect of discrimination on pay is greater in managerial and clerical 
occupations (Bradley et al, 2015). In Japan and South Korea, the GPG is also smaller in 
the public sector than in private companies (Cho et al, 2010; Morikawa, 2016). In South 
Korea, two factors explain the much lower GPG in the public sector (Cho et al, 2010). 
First, the self-selection by female workers with high levels of human capital who decide 
to enter the public sector. Second, the greater levels of institutional efforts, e.g. wage 
structure, the enforcement of gender equality related laws, and the provision of paid 
family leave to lower the GPG within the public sector.  
In the U.S. public sector setting, there is also evidence of a GPG. For public officials 
in similar positions, the GPG ranged from $5,035 to $9,577 (Alkadry and Tower, 2006). 
In the same context, Alkadry and Tower (2011) conclude that gender affects the amount 
of authority that is delegated to an employee, which, in turn, affects the variance in pay 
between men and women. The GPG has narrowed over the past 35 years in state 
governments, although the main progress was before 2000 (Lewis et al, 2017). Barbezat 
and Hughes (2005) reported, for academic centres, that male faculty members earned 
around 20% more than comparable female colleagues. Despite recent efforts to eliminate 
discrimination, the gender-based inequity, including unequal salaries, persists in both 
public and private non-profit research universities (Rabovsky and Lee, 2017). 
Nonetheless, these authors estimate a lower GPG than previous studies. In the healthcare 
sector, Desai et al (2016) report reimbursement differentials between women and men in 
a large proportion of medical specialties, even after adjusting for productivity, amount of 




(2010) find a negative association between compensation and being a woman among 
hospital CEOs, although the difference is not statistically significant.  
Differences in compensation levels are sometimes explained because of variable 
components of the remuneration. McGee et al (2015) find that women are less likely than 
men to receive competitive compensation. Kulich et al. (2011) find that bonuses awarded 
to men are larger than those allocated to women because managerial compensation of 
male executive directors is much more performance-sensitive than that of female ones. 
Le et al (2011) show that females are much more risk averse than males, but differences 
in attitudes towards economic risk explain only a small part of the GPG. A greater female 
risk aversion explains why female executives hold significantly lower equity incentives 
and demand larger salary premiums for bearing a given level of compensation risk (Carter 
et al 2017). This aspect is important because gender differences in salary negotiations can 
affect the variable part of the remuneration either because women are less likely to engage 
in bargaining than men (see Del Bono and Vuri, 2011) or because when there is no explicit 
statement that wages are negotiable, men are more likely to negotiate for a higher wage 
than women (Leibbrandt and List, 2015).  
 
3. Female presence and remuneration in NHS FT boards 
Data from the NHS Employers organisation (NHSemployers, 2018) shows that 
77% of the NHS workforce is made up of women, but they have a lower representation 
in top jobs. Women represent 45% of the medical staff and 47% of very senior manager 
roles in the NHS. However, female presence in these positions is variable. The Sealy 
report (Sealy, 2017) shows that the proportion of female-held seats on boards is, on 
average, 41%, ranging from 8.3% to 80%, with differences depending on the type of NHS 




Women represent 85% of chief nurses but only 26% and 25% for chief finance and 
medical officers, respectively, with an unbalanced proportion of women on the non-
executive seats of the NHS boards, one-third women, two-thirds men. NHS organizations 
present better figures regarding female presence on boards than private sector entities (see 
Sealy, 2017). This is most likely due to the high presence of women in the NHS as a 
whole and the result of a number of initiatives to improve gender equality on boards. The 
NHS has embraced the target of 50% women on its boards by 2020 (Sealy, 2017) and it 
also has action plans aimed at increasing the number of women in leading posts (Newman, 
2015). The NHS Improvement organisation, which is responsible for overseeing FTs, 
among other NHS organizations, is tasked with improving leadership diversity in the 
NHS. It regularly measures and publishes different aspects related to board diversity (e.g., 
gender or ethnicity) as a way to achieve diverse boards (NHS Improvement, 2018b). 
The FT Code of Governance includes provisions about the establishment of a 
remuneration committee composed of non-executive directors, which sets the 
remuneration of the executive directors, including the CEO. Specific gender figures for 
FTs show that, for the 2010/11 financial year, there was a significant presence of women 
on FT boards, with an average of 40% for executive directors and 32% for non-executive 
directors (Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle, 2015). More recent figures confirm the high 
female presence, 42.7% of female directors in the FTs for 2017 (see Sealy, 2017). As 
previously stated, a high female presence on the FT top managerial level is expected to 
have a positive effect in reducing the GPG. In addition, Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle 
(2016) describe the FT context as a context with unequivocal compliance with the 
structures of corporate governance, which most likely helps to enhance the role of the 
remuneration committees of FT boards. Strong governance mechanisms are important in 




and in improving the functioning of monitoring mechanisms such as the remuneration 
committees.  
FTs must disclose detailed information about the remuneration of executive and 
non-executive members of the board, in the form of a table in the remuneration section 
of the annual report. The information includes salary and allowances, other remuneration, 
performance-related bonuses, taxable benefits and information about pension benefits. 
This information allows us to study possible pay gaps considering the different ways in 
which CEOs can be remunerated, such as salary, bonuses and long-term remuneration 
received in the form of pension benefits.  
In terms of possible remuneration differences due to performance bonuses, the 
study of Garcia-Lacalle et al (2018), conducted for the 2012/13 financial year, reports 
almost no bonus payments to the executive directors of the FTs. These authors argue that 
these organisations are reluctant to and might have difficulties in adopting performance-
related remuneration, which reduces the potential effect of risk-aversion differences when 
negotiating salaries in this setting.  
 
4. Research design. Sample and Methodology 
Our sample consists of the total number of FTs authorised at the end of two 
financial years: 2012/13 and 2017/18, 145 and 152 respectively. During 2017/18, 
employers with 250 or more employees in Great Britain are legally required to report 
annually on the GPG within their organisation. This measure, approved in 2015, has most 
likely increased the sensitivity towards the GPG in the UK. The 2012/2013 year has been 
chosen to have a 5-year period to observe the long-term evolution of both female presence 




The gender of the CEO has been obtained from the annual reports of each year, 
taking into account the person occupying this position at the end of the financial year (31st 
March), either on interim or permanent basis. For the 2017/18 year, 3 people were acting 
as the CEO of two FTs, because of strategic alliances or a merger process. In order to 
include 1 CEO per FT, for the description of female presence, 3 CEOs have been 
accounted twice. We have also computed the number of women on the top seat for non-
executive directors, that is, the chairperson. This way, a better picture of female presence 
on boards is presented.  
For the remuneration analyses, only those CEOs that have been in the seat during 
the whole year have been included, so remuneration is considered on an annual basis for 
all CEOs. The final sample for the analysis of remuneration and GPG consists of 114 FTs 
for 2012/13 and 113 FTs for 2017/18. These figures represent a very significant 
proportion of all FTs, around 75% of the total number of FTs authorised at the end of 
each year. For 2017/18, the FTs in which their CEOs received remuneration from two 
entities have not been included in the analyses because their remuneration is not 
established under the assumption of full-time dedication to a single FT. The remuneration 
figures of one female CEO have not been included because disclosures indicate that she 
is performing medical duties, which represent the main part of her total remuneration, so 
the assumption of full-time dedication to the board is not fulfilled. Finally, another female 
CEO has a salary in the range of other CEOs, but the pension benefits presented an 
extremely high value, 5 times more than any other CEO. Thus, we have not included her 
data in the analysis of pension benefits and total remuneration.  
Remuneration analyses are focused on the CEOs, and figures have been obtained 
from the remuneration section of the FTs’ annual reports. In the remuneration reports, 




Taxable benefits, which include benefits-in-kind, are usually presented rounded to the 
nearest £100. The disclosure of the information for pension benefits is enhanced in the 
annual reports of the 2017/18 year, and they are presented in bands of £2,500. The middle 
point of the band has been taken for the analyses. Our analyses have consisted on a 
combination of different univariate analyses. Box plot analyses have been carried out to 
obtain a graphical representation of the numerical data of salaries through their quartiles. 
The bottom of the box is the first quartile, whereas the top of the box is set by the third 
quartile. The band inside the box is the median (second quartile) of the sample. The 
extended lines from each side of the box represent the variability outside the upper and 
lower quartiles. Box-plots are very useful for identifying outliers and extreme values. 
Outliers, represented by circles, are values with a distance greater than 1.5 times the 
length of the box from the percentiles 75 (above) and 25 (below). Extreme values, marked 
with asterisks, are exceptional values with a distance greater than 3 times or more the 
length of the box. In addition, we have carried out descriptive and T-test of means, to 
compare whether two groups (in this case, men and women CEOs) have different average 
values. These analyses have been carried out for different remuneration levels: i) salary 
and ii) salary plus other remuneration, taxable benefits and performance bonuses for the 
two years, 2012/13 and 2017/18. Additionally, for 2017/18, pension benefits for those 
CEOs that report some amount, and total remuneration, which includes all remuneration 
components have also been computed.  
The amount included in pension benefits comprises all pension-related benefits 
including the cash value of payments in lieu of retirement benefits and all benefits in year 






5. Analysis of results 
Table 1 shows the number and percentage of female CEOs at the end of the two 
financial years analysed and the evolution during the 5-year period. At the end of the 
2012/13 financial year, of the 145 FTs, 54 had a female CEO (37.2%). This figure 
increases up to 72 of the 152 FTs (47.4%) at the end of the 2017/18 year, which represents 
an increase of more than 25% of female presence in the 5-year period. Female presence 
has reached almost the 50%, thus, parity exists for the CEO seat and it is possible to assert 
that the glass ceiling is broken in this prominent seat of the FTs. Our figures for the 
chairperson confirm previous studies of lower female presence on the most important 
non-executive seat of NHS boards. Despite a significant increase in the 5-year period, 
less than one third of the FTs, 48 out of 152 (31.8%), had a chairwoman at the end of the 
2017/18 year. 
Table 1. Women on top of the NHS FTs boards of directors. 
  2012/13 (145 FTs)  2017/18 (152 FTs)  ∆ 5-year period  
  N % N % N % 
Female CEOs 54 37.2 72 47.4 18 33.3 
Female Chairs 35 24.3* 48 31.8 13 30.8 
Note: * Over 144 FTs. One FT had vacant the chair of the board at the end of 2012/13. 
Figure 1 shows the box-plot representation of the salary, the main component of 
the remuneration, according to the gender of the CEOs for the two years. The overlapping 
of the boxes for men and women indicates that the distribution of the two samples is 
similar. However, the female sample presents a lower median (the line in the middle of 
each box) and a ‘narrower’ box, that is, a more concentrated distribution around the 
median. Therefore, these box-plots show that women tend to have lower salaries and that 
the variability in salaries tends to be higher for men. In 2012/13 year, the box-plot shows 




exceptional and might cause a misrepresentation of the overall situation analysed, 
therefore this case is removed from the descriptives and from the T-test of means analyses 
to obtain a better overall picture of what is happening in the FT context. There is also one 
outlier, one woman that had the lowest salary, £87,500. For 2017/18, the box-plot figure 
shows 2 outliers in the male sample, who had the highest salaries of all CEOs, and 2 
outliers in the female, also because of high salaries, although lower than those of some 
men. We have kept these cases for subsequent analyses. 
 
Figure 1.  
Box-plot representation of CEO salaries (£000) for 2012/13 (n=114) and 2017/18 (n=113) 
 
 




Table 2 presents the main descriptives and the result of the T-tests of two different 
remuneration levels for 2012/13 of the remaining 113 CEOs after removing the extreme 
case detected.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and T-test result for the 2012/13 financial year  
  Salary (£000)     
  N Mean Std. dev Min Max Median T-test 
Female 47 161.86 27.24 87.50 232.50 157.50 0.03** 
Male 66 175.17 34.62 117.50 257.50 170.00   
Total 113 169.64 32.31 87.50 257.50 162.50   
  Salary+Taxable benefits+Other remuneration (£000)   
  N Mean Std. dev Min Max Median T-test 
Female 47 163.89 28.09 87.50 232.50 157.50 0.013** 
Male 66 179.58 38.33 117.50 305.00 172.50   
Total 113 173.05 35.17 87.50 305.00 167.50   
 ** significant at the 0.05 level 
 
Table 2 shows that female CEOs had an average salary of almost £162,000 during 
2012/13, whereas the average salary of their male counterparts was more than £175,000. 
The salary difference is, on average, £13,300 lower for women, that is, 7.5% lower than 
men. The T-test indicates that the difference of means is statistically significant. When 
other components of remuneration are included in the analysis, mainly benefits-in-kind, 
other remuneration and performance bonuses, the average salary of female CEOs 
increases by about £2,000, whereas for men, the increment is, on average, almost £4,000. 
This results in a total difference of almost £16,000 and the significance of the T-test 
almost reaches the 0.01 level of significance. The inclusion of the previously removed 
extreme value would have increased the remuneration differences and the significance of 
the T-test. 
Table 3 presents figures for the remuneration levels of the 2017/18 financial year. 




remuneration received as pension benefits and the total remuneration received by CEOs, 
that is, salary, any other remuneration, pension benefits and total remuneration. For 
pension benefits, figures refer only to those CEOs whose FTs report some amount in this 
component of CEO remuneration in the remuneration section of the annual report. As 
explained in the methodology section, pension benefits and total remuneration of one 
female CEO have not been included because of the extreme figures presented in the 
remuneration report in comparison with the rest of the CEOs.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and T-test result for the 2017/18 financial year 
 Salary (£000)   
  N Mean Std. dev Min Max Median T-test 
Female 55 181.59 27.35 142.50 257.50 177.50 0.191 
Male 58 189.83 38.46 122.50 282.50 182.50   
Total 113 185.82 33.63 122.50 282.50 177.50   
Salary+Taxable benefits+Other remuneration (£000) 
  N Mean Std. dev Min Max Median T-test 
Female 55 183.43 26.49 147.50 257.50 177.50 0.119 
Male 58 193.02 37.68 137.50 282.50 187.50   
Total 113 188.35 32.93 137.50 282.50 182.50   
 Pension benefits (£000) (only for those that report some amount) 
  N Mean Std. dev Min Max Median T-test 
Female 41 77.35 67.09 6.75 256.25 51.25 0.147 
Male 40 59.54 38.71 1.25 153.75 51.25   
Total 81 68.55 55.34 1.25 256.25 51.25   
 Total remuneration (£000)   
  N Mean Std. dev Min Max Median T-test 
Female 54 242.40 69.00 157.50 427.50 217.50 0.446 
Male 58 233.55 53.01 137.50 377.50 222.50   
Total 112 237.81 61.12 137.50 427.50 222.50   
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
In 2017/18, the difference of the salaries between female and male CEOs has 
diminished, on average, to less than £8,500, which results in a lower salary than men of 
less than 5%. In this year, the difference of the means is no longer statistically significant. 




£5,000 in 2017/18. Therefore, the 5-year period has resulted in a significant narrowing of 
the salary gap. When other components of remuneration are included, mainly benefits-in-
kind and performance bonuses, the increment of the remuneration level is lower than in 
2012/13, with an increase of less than £2,000 for women and about £3,200 for men. The 
remuneration difference increases to almost £10,000, but it is not statistically significant, 
and still less than 5% lower for women than men.  
The information provided for 2017/18 about pension benefits allows a better 
analysis of the total remuneration of the CEOs, and the results are very interesting. For 
the CEOs included in the NHS pension scheme, 81 of 112 (72%) cases analysed, women 
receive pension benefits of around £18,000 more than men. The median of the pension 
benefits is the same for women and men and the mean difference is not statistically 
significant. The same median value and the much higher standard deviation of this 
remuneration component for women are an indication that, rather than being a general 
characteristic of women receiving more pension benefits than men, some few female 
CEOs are receiving relatively high pension benefits. The inclusion of the pension benefits 
to all other remuneration components results in the reversion of the pay gap. Women 
receive, on average, a total remuneration of £242,400, which is around £8,900 (3.8%) 
higher than men, with the difference being not statistically significant. In this year, the 
minimum total remuneration is for a man and the maximum for a woman. The median 
value of the total remuneration, £5,000 lower for women, indicates that the reversion of 
the differences of means is a consequence of few women getting a higher remuneration 
in the form of pension benefits, as explained before, than because of a generalised 
situation. Figure 2 shows the box-plot distribution of the total remuneration for men and 
women, which is very illustrative. As this information is only available for the 2017/18, 




quartile of the distribution are lower for women than men. The total remuneration of 5 
women are represented as outliers, 2 of them with the same value but lower than some 
men, and 3 of them with the highest total remuneration in 2017/18.  
Figure 2. Box-plot representation of CEO total remuneration (£000) (n=112) for 2017/18 
 
 
6. Discussion  
 
Female presence and gender pay gaps (GPG) have been extensively researched in 
private sector organisations. In the boards of directors of this sector, gender inequality is 
frequently reported by both academic studies and official figures, supporting the glass 
ceiling effect. The existence of a GPG is also found and usually attributed to some kind 
of discrimination. However, in the boards of directors of the public sector, these issues 
have received less attention. Although the public sector is a more egalitarian context, 
existing literature shows that the GPG also exists, albeit to a lesser extent than in the 





The FTs of the NHS provide a key public service . They are managed by boards 
of directors which  have moved from less than 38% female presence to more than 47% 
during the last 5 years Thus, the proportion of female CEOs falls within the 45-55 percent 
range to be considered a ‘truly balanced’ situation (see Sealy, 2017). However, as 
different reports show, the glass ceiling seems to exist in other board seats. We have also 
computed the number of women in the most prominent non-executive seat of the board, 
the chair. The proportion has increased from 24.3% to 31.6%. Thus, for chairpersons, 
parity has not been achieved yet. This result, together with the figures reported above, are 
consistent with the findings of Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2015), who found that female 
presence in the non-executive seats of the board is lower than for the executive seats, 
suggesting that the appointment of women for non-executive seats may be influenced by 
similar factors that result in a lower democratic representation of females in parliaments. 
These results also show that women may find it easier to climb stairs for some board seats 
than for others. As the nomination and remuneration committees are made of non-
executive board members, the inclusion of more women as non executives might help to 
increase female presence further in the executive seats and to reduce the GPG.  
The box-plot analysis has shown that salaries present a similar distribution 
between men and women for the two years studied. However, the mean values of the 
salaries are lower for women than for men, and the T-test analysis has shown that female 
CEOs had a significantly lower salary than their male counterparts in 2012/13, which 
amounted to about £13,000. The gap was even wider when other remuneration was 
included in the analysis. Five years later, the salary gap has been reduced to less than 
£8,500. The reduction is more evident in terms of the proportion that the gap represents 
in comparison to the salary of male CEOs, narrowing from 7.5% to less than 5%, and the 




bonuses are not frequent in NHS FTs (see Garcia-Lacalle et al, 2018), when other 
components of remuneration are included in the analyses, such as benefits-in-kind and 
performance bonuses, the gap is greater, but remains statistically non-significant. These 
findings, together with the more stretched box-plots for men’s salary, could be an 
indicator that male CEOs in NHS FTs are more prone to negotiate their salaries and other 
components of their remuneration. As shown by Lucifora and Meurs (2006), higher 
employer discretion in wage setting may contribute to increase pay dispersion in the UK. 
Figures disclosed in the annual reports for 2017/18 have allowed us to study an 
important component of the remuneration, pension benefits, and to include it for the 
analysis of the total remuneration of the CEOs. This reverses the GPG, and results in a 
higher total remuneration average for women than men. However, the median value is 
lower for women. Thus, the ‘reversion’ effect is due to some few women getting very 
high pension benefits rather than benefiting most women. Overall, these results are 
consistent with those found by Brickley et al (2010) in the US, who found a negative 
association between compensation and being a woman among hospital CEOs, although 
the difference is not statistically significant. These results also support the idea that men 
negotiate differently than women some components of their remuneration.  
During a 5-year period, the GPG has narrowed in a way in which it is no longer 
statistically significant. In 2017/18, the gap may be important in absolute terms, more 
than £8,000 for the salary and almost £10,000 when benefits in kinds and bonuses are 
included, but these differences are not so important when observed in relative terms. Our 
analyses do not allow us to affirm that differences for some components of the 
remuneration are due to some kind of discrimination. The salaries of the CEOs also 
depend on organisational aspects (such as the size of the FT, the type of services provided 




also possible, as stated, that women and men negotiate salaries in a different way, which 
would be signalling gender traits differences. Median figures are systematically 
unfavourable for women and some kind of discrimination, or some gender traits that 
influence remuneration, cannot be completely discarded. However, the remuneration 
distributions shown by the box-plot graphs, with quite similar distributions for the two 
genders, suggest that differences are most likely due to organizational, human capital 
factors or differences in salaries negotiation between men and women rather than due to 
discrimination. The reversion of the GPG for 2017/18, when total remuneration is 
considered, helps us to support the argument that there is no discrimination. Moreover, 
the FT context is a favourable setting for women: public sector organisations, where 
regulation is better enforced; in a sector, healthcare, characterised by a high female 
presence in most levels; and with boards of directors with a significant female presence 
moving to parity. Further research should help to ascertain whether gender traits and 
discrimination are behind remuneration differences or whether they are mainly explained 
by organisational or human capital factors.  
To conclude this section, it is worth highlighting the limitations of our empirical 
analyses. First, salary information is provided in the remuneration reports in bands of 
£5,000 (£2,500 for pension benefits). Therefore, we do not have the exact amount for the 
remuneration of each CEO, and we have used the middle of the bands for our analyses. 
Exact figures could lead to some different results. Second, we have computed female 
presence and salary variation over a 5-year period, but we cannot ensure whether the 
increases have taken place regularly on a yearly basis or whether fluctuations exist within 
this period. Further research could extend the analysis to include more years and yearly 
trends. Further research on pension benefits is also needed. The pension benefits 




women or because of women’s  personal choice for present salary sacrifices in exchange 
of greater pension contributions. Nowadays, there are two pension schemes in the NHS, 
the 1995/2008 Scheme and the 2015 Scheme, which may also cause differences in 
pension benefits. Finally, tax penalties may affect pension contributions and generate 
gender differences: if an individual’s total pension savings exceed the lifetime allowance, 
, a tax charge is due on the excess benefits (NHSemployers, 2019). Nonetheless, our 
figures provide interesting insights about the gender issue in organisations that manage a 
huge amount of public resources and are so important in the lives of citizens.  
 
7. Conclusions  
The glass ceiling might not be removed in the NHS as a whole, but for the most 
prominent executive seat of the board of directors of Financial Trusts (FTs), the CEO, the 
women-men relationship has almost reached parity in 2017/18 (47-53%), so the glass 
ceiling is shattered for this top position in FTs. However, previous studies and official 
figures, as well as our own figures for the chairperson indicate that, despite 
improvements, gender equality has not been reached for certain top-management 
positions. These results suggest that climbing stairs may be easier for some board seats 
than for others.  
Our analyses of the gender pay gap (GPG) evolution in a 5-year period, the 
financial years 2012/13 and 2017/18, indicate a narrowing of the gap, which has become 
statistically non-significant in the last financial year. The NHS context, in general, and 
the structure of the boards of directors of its FTs in particular, should be favourable for 
women and help to reduce possible discrimination towards them. Reaching parity may be 
a factor that helps narrowing the GPG in the boardroom. The fact that, on average, the 




that the salary gap is not due to discrimination but perhaps other traits such as female 
preference to be more risk averse and hence sacrifice present salary for future financial 
security. There is still a gap, not statistically significant but important in monetary terms, 
for the main component of the remuneration, the salary. However, the component of the 
remuneration that is higher for some women is pension benefits. Further research is 
needed to explain the causes of these differences in remuneration levels in specific top 
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